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Host Country Risk and Foreign Ownership Strategy:  
Meta-Analysis and Theory on the Moderating Role of Home Country Institutions 
 
Highlights:  
• the country risk–ownership strategy relationship (CR–OS) is positively moderated by 
institutional constraints on policymakers and risk-taking tendencies in a firm’s home country 
• the CR–OS relationship is negatively moderated by the joint effect of institutional constraints 
on policymakers and risk-taking tendencies in a firm’s home country 







Host Country Risk and Foreign Ownership Strategy:  





Empirical evidence for the relationship between host country risk and a firm’s ownership level in 
its foreign entry strategy is inconclusive. We revisit this relationship by integrating the 
internalisation logic with an institution-based view to examine the moderating effects of formal 
and informal institutions in the home country. By meta-analysing 64 empirical studies involving 
52,229 ownership decisions on foreign market entry, this study gives support to theoretical 
arguments that the focal relationship is positively moderated by institutional constraints on 
policymakers and risk-taking tendencies in the home country but is negatively moderated by the 
joint effect of these two institutional factors. These findings shed new light on the literature of 
host country risk and foreign ownership strategy. Besides describing the implications of the 
findings for theory and practice, we discuss the agenda for future theory development in 
international business. 
Keywords: host country risk, ownership strategy, home country institutions, meta-analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
As a primary source of external uncertainty, country risk has been widely recognised as a 
central issue in international business (IB) research (Cosset & Roy, 1991; Miller, 1992). Over the 
past three decades, a number of empirical studies have examined how host country risk may 
affect the level of ownership in a firm’s foreign market entry strategy (e.g., Erramilli, Agarwal, & 
Kim, 1997; Slangen & van Tulder, 2009; Wooster, Blanco, & Sawyer, 2015). Some found that 
firms may choose a low level of ownership to enter a high-risk host country, and others found the 
opposite (see Ahsan & Musteen, 2011; Morschett, Schramm-Klein, & Swoboda, 2010; Surdu & 





mature understanding of the country risk–ownership strategy (CR–OS) relationship, the IB field 
has yet to fully understand the mechanism of ownership strategy as a way to internalise external 
uncertainty rooted in host country risk. We argue that the inconsistent findings in prior research 
on the CR–OS relationship result mainly from the inadequacy of this research to take into 
account home country formal and informal institutions. 
The extant literature has paid growing attention to home country effects on firm 
internationalisation. For example, a home country’s institutional framework (Buckley, Voss, 
Cross, & Clegg, 2011), institutional stability (Barnard & Luiz, 2018), labour protection (Weng & 
Peng, 2018), autocracy (Clegg, Voss, & Tardios, 2018) and subnational institutions (Tang, 2019) 
have been found to influence firm internationalisation. The home country is important for IB 
research because it shapes a business ecosystem in which firms compete and collaborate to obtain 
resources for internationalisation (Hobdari, Gammeltoft, Li, & Meyer, 2017), and it determines 
comparative advantages and disadvantages, country-of-origin merits and liabilities, and firms’ 
practices of learning in and escaping from the home country (Cuervo-Cazurra, Luo, Ramamurti, 
& Ang, 2018). Yet, despite such importance, little effort has been made to examine the 
moderating effect of home country institutions on the CR–OS relationship. The majority of 
empirical studies on this relationship, including prior meta-analyses, have either focused on 
institutional distances between home and host countries, taken home country institutions as a 
given background, or relied on a narrow conceptualisation of the home country effect by using a 
dummy variable (e.g., Morschett, et al., 2010; Zhao, Luo, & Suh, 2004). Such a gap in the 
literature hinders our understanding of the impact of country risk on firm internationalisation and, 
especially, the boundary condition of this impact. 
This study addresses this gap both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we 





understand the strategy for handling external uncertainty and the latter to analyse the effects of 
home country formal and informal institutions. Specifically, we view a firm’s foreign ownership 
strategy as a decision on the degree to which the firm will internalise international activities in an 
environment in which outcomes of international expansion are unpredictable (Buckley & Casson, 
1976; Miller, 1992) and consider home country contexts as complex rules and norms that define 
essential structures of a society and regulate the behaviour of members in the society (North, 
1990). Within a country, formal institutions are often taken to mean that the rules are made 
explicit or written down, particularly if they are enforced by the state. In contrast, informal rules 
are implicit in that “informal constraints defy, for the most part, neat specification” (North, 1990, 
p. 36). Such informal rules include “codes of conduct, norms of behaviour, and convention” as 
well as “extensions, elaborations and modifications of formal rules”, and they “are a part of the 
heritage that we call culture” (North, 1990, pp. 36 - 40). Home country formal and informal 
institutions shape managerial cognition and facilitate or constrain the use of strategic resources 
and capabilities and, therefore, are fundamental for firms to develop and maintain competitive 
advantages in internationalisation (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Jackson & Deeg, 2008). 
Empirically, we employ advanced meta-analytic techniques to examine the findings of prior 
research directly and synthesise a number of single-country studies to develop a single multi-
country model, thereby maximizing the diversity of home country contexts, in which hypotheses 
about home institutional effects on the CR–OS relationship are tested. Specifically, our meta-
analytic study combines empirical findings of 64 studies with 52,339 entry strategy decisions and 
tests a set of hypotheses with meta-regression models based on 38 studies with 32,854 entry 
strategy decisions. This enables us to demonstrate the impacts of formal and informal institutions 





meta-analyses (Morschett, et al., 2010; Zhao, et al., 2004) that have included the CR–OS 
relationship as a small fraction in their analyses and left the inconsistency problem unsolved. 
The contributions of this study are threefold. First, we extend the internalisation logic by 
revealing a set of boundary conditions on the CR–OS relationship. These conditions are home 
country institutions. Their variation is attributed (partly) to the inconclusive findings in previous 
studies on the focal relationship. As such, our analysis goes beyond the objective of research 
synthesis towards theory extension. Second, our study contributes to the body of institution-based 
studies by distinguishing formal and informal institutions in an IB decision-making context. Prior 
studies have found the impact of institutions on firm internationalisation, and our study shows 
positive effects of home country formal and informal institutions on the CR–OS relationship as 
well as their different roles in strengthening this relationship. Third, we contribute to the 
knowledge of the interaction between formal and informal institutions by developing and testing 
competing hypotheses on whether the two types of institutions function as complements or 
substitutes. We find empirical support for the substitute argument. 
The rest of this paper proceeds by first discussing theoretical underpinnings and then 
developing hypotheses to formulate our theoretical predictions about the moderating effects of 
formal and informal institutions. After this, we describe research methods and present the results 
of both main and supplementary analyses. We conclude this paper with a discussion of future 
research paths, implications, and limitations. 
2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
2.1. Internalisation theory and foreign market entry strategy  
Firms can choose different entry strategies to expand in foreign markets. These strategies 





expectations of future returns (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Buckley & Casson, 1998) in the way 
that a high (low) level of ownership in an entry strategy indicates a high (low) level of control, 
risk exposure, required resources, and expected returns (Magnusson, Baack, Zdravkovic, Staub, 
& Amine, 2008). When firms are confronted with market imperfections in a high-risk host 
country, they may handle such imperfections by either undertaking international activities 
internally within the corporate hierarchy (e.g., a high level of ownership in a foreign subsidiary), 
or utilising external market mechanisms, such as exporting and cross-border distribution 
(Dunning & Rugman, 1985). This choice depends on the degree to which firm resources can be 
successfully exploited in the host country using direct investment (Buckley & Casson, 1976). 
This classic rationale for a decision on foreign ownership strategy is provided by 
internalisation theory. Rooted in the intellectual foundations of Coase (1937), this theory assumes 
that firms minimise the costs of international activities by entering the best locations with the 
most efficient strategies (Buckley & Casson, 1976) and suggests that firms exploit imperfections 
and organise cross-national interdependencies within corporate boundaries (Hennart, 1982). If the 
external imperfections of host market structures outweigh the internal uncertainty caused by 
external uncertainty, efficiency-driven economic actors take hierarchical governance approaches 
to the attainment of global efficiency goals; otherwise, they rely on external markets (Rugman, 
1981). Internalisation theory has been widely accepted in the IB literature and applied to the 
analysis of foreign ownership strategy (Surdu & Mellahi, 2016). 
Despite its popularity, internalisation theory needs to be extended to take home country 
effects into account for firms’ strategic responses to host market environments. Because the 
theory was initially formulated in advanced economies (e.g., globally leading firms in Buckley & 
Casson, 1976; Canadian firms in Rugman, 1981) where the influence of home country 





internationalisation, thereby implying potential theoretical concerns. First, internalisation theory 
assumes—albeit implicitly—the home environment as a given background (Buckley, et al., 2007; 
Ramamurti & Hillemann, 2018). Yet institutional environments of the home country are key 
determinants of firm resources and strategies (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Cuervo-Cazurra, et al., 
2018; Hobdari, et al., 2017). In particular, following the growth of emerging-market firms’ direct 
investment in developed economies, prior approaches to the integration of corporate governance 
and inefficient host markets may not still be effective (Luo & Tung, 2017; Voss, Buckley, & 
Cross, 2010). Second, internalisation theory assumes that firms are naturally equipped with the 
capabilities to predict costs in a host country and, if necessary, these firms internalise 
externalities there (Chi, 2015). However, such capabilities vary among firms headquartered in 
different countries. Prior research has shown that, for example, firms from home countries 
characterised by weaker formal institutions may be less sensitive to explicit rules for minimising 
transaction costs in foreign countries (Holburn & Zelner, 2010), therefore being incapable of 
understanding actual costs. Finally, although prior research based on internalisation logic has 
intensively investigated cultural contexts in host countries and home–host cultural differences 
(Magnusson, et al., 2008; Zhao, et al., 2004), internalisation theory downplays the impact of 
home country informal institutions on a firm’s international expansion (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & 
Chen, 2009). Despite the analytical reliance of foreign market entry on formal and rational 
procedures, informal institutions may at times override an entry decision based on rational 
calculations. Therefore, the internalisation logic may need modification to model the relationship 
between host country risk and a firm’s ownership-specific decision on foreign market entry, and 
the logic can be complemented with an institution-based view to take account of the moderating 





2.2. The institution-based view: moderating effects of home country institutions 
Institutions are regarded as rules and norms that structure the interaction among social 
entities (North, 1990). According to the institution-based view, a central premise of international 
business is that a firm’s strategies and practices, as well as their consequences, are contingent on 
institutional factors—the formal and informal “rules of the game” (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 
2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). These institutional factors influence the internationalisation of 
firms residing in a country by limiting the set of resources available for an entry strategy and 
influencing firms’ preferences for and assessment of the strategy (Buckley, 2018) because formal 
and informal institutions shape an economy’s resource environment and thus the resources and 
capabilities of firms embedded in the environment (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). For example, firms 
from a politically uncertain environment have strong abilities to deal with policy risk overseas 
(Jiménez, Benito-Osorio, Puck, & Klopf, 2018). Therefore, formal and informal institutions may 
be modelled as moderators to explain variance in the CR–OS relationship across home countries. 
Prior research has shown the impact of formal and informal institutions on firm 
internationalisation. For example, an array of studies have examined the effect of formal 
institutions on international business strategies, such as the scope of global expansion (Wu & 
Chen, 2014), export and investment activities (Sun, Peng, Lee, & Tan, 2015), subsidiary 
strategies (Wei & Nguyen, 2017), and foreign establishment mode decisions (Liu & Yu, 2018), 
demonstrating that formal institutions have strong influences on firm internationalisation. 
Likewise, authors of another stream of the literature have investigated the effect of informal 
institutions on international business decisions, including a firm’s foreign market entry strategy 
(Guillén, 2003), foreign market entry timing (Stevens & Dykes, 2012), and offshoring innovation 
(Sartor & Beamish, 2014). In addition, a third group of prior studies have focused on moderating 





location choices (Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014), firm internationalisation and 
performance (Marano, Arregle, Hitt, Spadafora, & van Essen, 2016), and state ownership and 
internationalisation (Estrin, Meyer, Nielsen, & Nielsen, 2016). In the present study, we 
investigate the moderating effects of home country formal and informal institutions on the CR–
OS relationship in that home country institutions may facilitate or impede firms’ capabilities of 
handling host country risk with a certain level of ownership.  
2.3. Formal institutions 
Formal institutions are deliberately devised to buttress market efficiency by monitoring 
behaviour, sanctioning defection, and enabling social entities to exchange information (North, 
1990; Williamson, 2000). Being established and enforced by governmental authorities, formal 
institutions are intended to shape an environment that leads firms to pursue their interests and 
make choices rationally (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pejovich, 1999). The force of formal 
institutions is rooted in institutional constraints on policymakers. These constraints in a firm’s 
home country may affect the CR–OS relationship by shaping a politically stable home 
environment and providing effective support for the firm (Jackson & Deeg, 2008), both of which 
enable the firm to focus on transaction costs in foreign countries and leverage existing resources 
to handle foreign market uncertainty. 
Institutional constraints check and balance diverse institutional actors in policymaking 
systems. In a system with relatively weak constraints, policymaking authority is either 
concentrated in the hands of several policymakers or shared among policymakers with similar 
political preferences, implying the ease of policy change and, consequently, unstable formal 
institutions. Prior research, for example, has identified weak institutional constraints as a central 





(Henisz, 2000; Knack & Keefer, 1995). Conversely, a country with strong institutional 
constraints is characterised by well-distributed policymaking authority. Within such a system, 
individual policymakers with different partisan affiliations populate multiple constitutionally 
separate branches of a government, implying balanced policymaking forces and stable 
institutions. The mainstream logic of political research states that a more democratically oriented 
policymaking system provides more certainty and predictability in a society (Olson, 1993). 
Firms from such a society, therefore, are less likely to be distracted by an institutionally 
unstable environment at home and, instead, able to pay more attention to foreign country risk, 
thereby allocating more resources to handle risk in a foreign country. Because formal institutions 
are designed to reduce uncertainty for relatively predictable behaviour, an unstable political 
environment where formal rules are changed frequently and unpredictably (due to weak 
institutional constraints) becomes a source of uncertainty (Banalieva, 2014), but strong 
institutional constraints result in a stable environment with less uncertainty. Also, strong 
institutional constraints require the government to allocate national resources transparently and 
provide support without preferences for firms affiliated with a certain political party, suggesting 
that the majority of firms can equally obtain governmental support and develop specific 
competence in handling difficulties in a foreign environment (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). 
Furthermore, firms from countries with strong institutional constraints have been found to be 
inadequate for controlling policy-related transaction costs in foreign countries (Holburn & 
Zelner, 2010). These firms need to avoid incorrect anticipation of positive outcomes in a foreign 
market and make market entries profitable by controlling host country externalities within their 
corporate hierarchy if they choose to enter the foreign market (Agarwal, 1994), though firms 





transaction costs rooted in formal institutions via market mechanisms (e.g., external partners in 
host countries). Therefore, we propose the following: 
Hypothesis 1. Home country institutional constraints strengthen the relationship between 
host country risk and the ownership level of a firm’s entry strategy such that the higher 
(lower) the level of institutional constraints in the firm’s home country, the stronger 
(weaker) the relationship between host country risk and the firm’s ownership strategy. 
2.4. Informal institutions  
Informal institutions are socially shared rules (usually unwritten norms) that are created, 
communicated, and enforced outside of formal policymaking systems. These institutions 
represent “the cultural filter that provides continuity so that the informal solution to exchange 
problems in the past carries over into the present and makes those informal constraints important 
sources of continuity in long-run societal change” (North, 1990, p. 37). In this sense, informal 
institutions are grounded in specific cultures, not changed easily by deliberate policies, and 
continuously re-enacted through generations (Hofstede, 1980; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, 
& Gupta, 2004).  
Similar to formal institutions, informal institutions may affect a firm’s strategy for entering 
a foreign country, but there are differences between formal and informal institutions. First, the 
enforcement of formal institutions relies on the coercive power of the state, such as through 
courts or arbitrage bodies (Dyer & Singh, 1998), but informal institutions are self-enforced by 
means of sanctions, such as expulsion from the community and ostracism by friends and 
neighbours (Pejovich, 1999). Second, while formal institutions are regulated by the third-party 
enforcement mechanisms, informal institutions may have regulatory potential from the 





Suchman, 2008), which define the best practices for organisations in a country and determine 
their foreign market entry strategy (Schwens, Eiche, & Kabst, 2011). Because the fundamentals 
of informal institutions are embedded in the culture of a society, uncertainty avoidance—an 
important dimension of culture—reflects the social norm in regard to risk-taking behaviour and 
represents a type of informal institutions that are most directly related to a decision in the 
presence of host country risk. 
Uncertainty avoidance indicates the extent to which social actors may be threatened by 
ambiguous situations and the extent to which uncertainty is tolerated in a society (House, et al., 
2004). Societies with strong uncertainty avoidance tend to “take more moderate calculated risks” 
with “risk aversion”, and those with weak uncertainty avoidance are likely to “be less calculating 
when taking risk” and to engage in “risk taking” activities (House, et al., 2004, p. 618). In the 
context of foreign market entry, a high level of country risk means more unpredictable economic 
outcomes and potential political hazards (Cosset & Roy, 1991; Miller, 1992), but such risk is less 
likely to be resisted by firms from a society with strong risk-taking tendencies (i.e., weak 
uncertainty avoidance). These firms are willing to handle a high level of country risk and are 
likely used to dealing with external risks by engaging in a hierarchical ownership structure 
because such a strategy enables them to control external uncertainty internally (Henisz, 2002; 
Hennart, 2001; Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990). In contrast, firms from risk-averse societies (i.e., 
strong uncertainty avoidance) may prefer a low level of ownership to enter a high-risk host 
country because a low degree of resource commitment leads to less exposure to risk and allows 
for maintaining lower long-term costs (Brouthers, 2002; Delios & Beamish, 1999). We therefore 





Hypothesis 2. Risk-taking tendencies strengthen the relationship between host country risk 
and the ownership level of a firm’s entry strategy such that the higher (lower) the level of 
risk-taking tendencies in the firm’s home country, the stronger (weaker) the relationship 
between host country risk and the firm’s ownership strategy. 
2.5. Interactions between formal and informal institutions 
While formal and informal institutions originate from different sources, they coexist in a 
society and influence each other (Paxton, 2002; Webb, Khoury, & Hitt, 2019). In the context of 
firm internationalisation, formal and informal institutions may fulfil similar voids in facilitating 
firms’ strategies (Peng & Khoury, 2009). Thus, after investigating the separate effects of formal 
and informal institutions, an intuitive question to ask is how they jointly and interdependently 
affect the CR–OS relationship. The extant literature provides two competing views. 
One view is that formal and informal institutions complement each other, in that one type 
improves the effectiveness of the other, and that their joint effects are conducive to economic 
growth and firm internationalisation (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Hall and Gingerich (2009) argue 
that “One set of institutions is said to be complementary to another when its presence raises the 
returns available from the other” (p. 450), suggesting a reciprocal association between the two 
types of institutions. On the one side, the effectiveness of formal institutions depends on informal 
institutions because the latter provide the background within which the former are embedded 
(Williamson, 2000) and “the [informal] norms . . . provide the essential ‘legitimacy’ to any set of 
formal rules” (North, 1995, p. 25). On the other side of the reciprocal association, informal 
institutions rely on formal institutions to develop. When formal institutions are changing in a 
society, informal rules that gradually evolve as extensions of previous formal institutions may 





are more effective, informal institutions such as trust, civic norms, and social capital are stronger 
(Hall & Gingerich, 2009). 
The institutional complementary view applies to the focal relationship examined in this 
current study in multiple ways. First, institutional constraints on policymakers in a country with a 
strong risk-taking tendency may be more effective in providing support to firms that enter a high-
risk host country. Policymakers from the risk-taking culture are likely to support risk-taking 
behaviour. When their decisions on policies are better aligned with the interests of the majority of 
social entities (due to institutional constraints), firms will gain stable support from formal 
institutions at home to handle host country risk. Second, informal norms of risk taking may more 
effectively guide firms to take a high level of control in a high-risk host country when 
institutional constraints can force formal institutions to support managerial decisions on the high-
level ownership strategy for entering an uncertain environment. Putting this together, the 
combination of formal and informal institutions may strengthen the CR–OS relationship through 
joint effects of both institutional types. Consequently, a hypothesis based on the institutional 
complementary view is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3a. The effectiveness of institutional constraints in regard to strengthening the 
relationship between host country risk and the ownership level of a firm’s entry strategy 
increases in the presence of strong risk-taking tendencies and vice versa. 
Another view holds that formal and informal institutions substitute for each other in the 
sense that they can independently strengthen the focal relationship and may not necessarily come 
into effect simultaneously in promoting certain behaviour. One reason is that they represent 
different institutional objectives in the way that formal institutions aim to support more 





for which social identity and reputation are important (Gilson, 2007). This divergence suggests 
conflicting expectations that indicate inconsistent directions to social entities that seek normative 
guidance and constraints (Lee & Weng, 2013). In particular, it may be inefficient and 
uneconomic to maintain two institutional systems in parallel (Peng & Khoury, 2009; Peng, et al., 
2009). 
Prior research has shown that formal rules shape only a small, though important, part of an 
institutional environment and informal norms are often pervasive (North, 1990). If formal 
constraints are absent from or incomplete for supporting firm internationalisation, informal norms 
may intervene by assessing host country risk and guiding firms to choose a strategy (Peng & 
Khoury, 2009). During the institutional transition in a country, informal institutions are often 
expected to fill formal institutional voids (Kim & Song, 2016) and to encourage firms to develop 
informal relationships (Lee, Abosag, & Kwak, 2012). In countries where formal institutions are 
well developed, however, these institutions may take the place of informal institutions in regard 
to business activities (Shaner & Maznevski, 2011), and the effect of informal institutions 
becomes weak (Paxton, 2002). 
 When both formal and informal institutions are in place, they may exert independent 
impacts on firm strategies (Keig, Brouthers, & Marshall, 2015), and there may be institutional 
contradictions that increase the costs of compliance (Millar, Eldomiaty, Choi, & Hilton, 2005). 
Competing and redundant institutional structures provide contradictory directions (Peng, et al., 
2009; Sun, et al., 2015), which lead to confusion and sway opinions about risk-taking activities. 
Although some factors such as international experience may facilitate firms’ expansion in a risky 
environment (e.g., Jiménez, et al., 2018), firms’ capability to take advantage of these factors may 
not be improved when both types of institutions are highly effective in causing contradictions. 





Hypothesis 3b. The effectiveness of institutional constraints in regard to strengthening the 
relationship between host country risk and the ownership level of a firm’s entry strategy 
decreases in the presence of strong risk-taking tendencies and vice versa. 
3. Meta-analysis 
3.1. Procedure 
We followed the most recent meta-analytic studies (e.g., Bailey, 2018; Lindner, Klein, & 
Schmidt, 2018; Tang & Gudergan, 2018) and best-practice recommendations for meta-analysis in 
international business and management (Buckley, Devinney, & Tang, 2014; Geyskens, Krishnan, 
Steenkamp, & Cunha, 2009) as the methodological baseline for our study. Table 1 provides an 
overview of our meta-analytic methods. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
3.2. Variables 
In line with prior meta-analyses (Morschett, et al., 2010; Zhao, et al., 2004), we defined 
ownership strategy as an entering firm’s proportion of equity investment in an international 
operation (Shieh & Wu, 2011; Surdu & Mellahi, 2016) and host country risk as the external 
uncertainty rooted in the unpredictability of political and macroeconomic factors (Cosset & Roy, 
1991; Miller, 1992). The correlation between country risk and ownership strategy was the central 
variable of our analyses. 
The first moderator of this correlation—institutional constraints—was measured using a 
political constraints index developed by Henisz (2000; 2002), which has been widely used as an 
institutional measure in IB studies (e.g., Jung, Beamish, & Goerzen, 2008; Laufs, Bembom, & 





index evaluates the extent to which formal relationships among a country’s branches of 
government (i.e., executive, legislative, and judicial) and the partisan composition of the 
individual actors inhabiting these branches constrain any one institutional actor from unilaterally 
effecting a change in policy (Henisz, 2000; Holburn & Zelner, 2010). In this sense, strong 
institutional constraints mean a high level of difficulty to change and, consequently, a stable 
formal institutional environment. The scale of this index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 suggesting the 
absence of institutional constraints on policymakers.  
Another moderator of the CR–OS relationship, risk-taking tendencies, was operationalised 
by the uncertainty avoidance index of the GLOBE cultural framework (House, et al., 2004). It 
measures a society’s tolerance of uncertainty and tendency to take a risk. A similar index is 
available in Hofstede’s cultural framework (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010), which defines 
uncertainty avoidance as “the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by 
ambiguous or unknown situations” (p. 191). In comparison with this, GLOBE provides a more 
relevant concept to our theoretical argument. This cultural framework defines a higher 
uncertainty-avoidance society as people who tend to “take more moderate calculated risks”, and a 
lower uncertainty-avoidance society as “[to] be less calculating when taking risks” (House, et al., 
2004, p. 618). In the robustness tests below, we took the Hofstede uncertainty avoidance index as 
an alternative measure of risk-taking tendencies, which produced consistent results. Moreover, 
we chose the society practices dimension of GLOBE’s uncertainty-avoidance index to examine 
the actual (i.e., “as is”) risk-taking tendencies of a society because the society values dimension 
demonstrates what people may value in a society and often is the opposite of how people actually 
behave (Brewer & Venaik, 2010). Because this index was originally scored between 1 and 7, 
with 1 indicating that a society is extremely risk taking, we reverse coded the index so that a 





Furthermore, we controlled for the confounding effects of three groups of variables: (1) 
other institutional factors, (2) methodological artefacts, and (3) potential publication bias. First, 
we took the influence of other institutional factors into consideration by including GDP, judicial 
proceedings, and investor protection. Second, we controlled for methodological influence by 
including manufacturing industry, SMEs, international experience, median sample year, and 
cross-sectional data. Third, we included published work and journal impact factor to control for 
the potential publication bias. Measures of these control variables are detailed in Table 2. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
4. Results 
4.1. Meta-analytic results of the CR–OS relationship 
Table 3 shows the correlation-based meta-analytic results for the focal relationship, 
revealing a modest but negative and significant association between host country risk and the 
ownership level of a firm’s entry strategy (mean ρ = –0.101, p-value < 0.05). Saliently, 
nevertheless, the level of heterogeneity is significant (Q = 2,101; I2 = 0.97), suggesting a high 
variance in the distribution of effect sizes. The funnel plot in Figure 1 also demonstrates a wide 
distribution of effect sizes. Putting results of the heterogeneity test and the funnel plot together 
suggests that the mean ρ is best considered as an average, rather than a common true correlation 
value (Hedges & Olkin, 1985), implying the need for moderation analyses.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 and Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Further inspection of the subgroup analyses in Table 3 reveals the cross-national 





effects. Specifically, while the integrated effect sizes of developing- and developed-economy 
groups are negative and statistically significant, associational directions vary among individual 
countries. For example, the subgroup mean ρ for Finland is positive (0.129) and statistically 
significant (p-value < 0.05), but that of Japan is negative (–0.188) and significant (p-value < 
0.05), further recommending meta-regression to better understand the moderation effects of home 
country institutions. Results of additional analyses at the study-, firm-, and industry- levels 
provide further evidence for this recommendation (Appendix 2). 
4.2. Results of the moderating effects of home country institutions 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of variables included in 
the meta-regression analysis. This analysis was based on 38 primary studies, each of which 
collected data in a single home country. We noted several high correlations and, therefore, 
conducted variance inflation factor (VIF) tests. Given the acceptable VIF values (i.e., all are 
smaller than 5.11), multicollinearity was not a serious concern in the meta-regression analyses 
(O’Brien, 2007). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
Table 5 displays meta-regression results for testing our hypotheses. Model 1 includes 
control variables only. Models 2 and 3 add institutional constraints and risk-taking tendencies, 
respectively. Model 4 includes both variables, and Model 5 shows their interaction effect. The 
incremental R-squared values from Model 1 to Model 5 demonstrate the statistical power of these 
models for hypothesis testing.  
------------------------------ 






Hypothesis 1 predicts that institutional constraints of the home country have a positive 
impact on the CR–OS relationship. The coefficient of institutional constraints is positive and 
statistically significant in Model 2 (β = 0.847, p-value < 0.01) as well as Models 4 and 5 (p-value 
< 0.05), suggesting that, as institutional constraints increase by 1 SD (i.e., 0.22), ceteris paribus, 
the correlation between host country risk and the ownership level of a firm’s entry strategy 
increases by approximately 0.186. Considering that the mean ρ is –0.101, the moderating effect 
of institutional constraints is substantial. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
Hypothesis 2 expects that firms from countries with strong risk-taking tendencies are more 
likely to enter a high-risk host country with a high level of ownership. In Model 3, the coefficient 
for risk-taking tendencies is 0.250 (p-value < 0.05), which is also consistently significant in 
Models 4 and 5. This means that a 1–SD increase of risk-taking tendencies (i.e., 0.55) may, 
ceteris paribus, result in the focal correlation’s increase by approximately 0.138. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 gains support. 
Hypothesis 3a posits a positive effect of the interaction of institutional constraints and risk-
taking tendencies on the focal relationship, but Hypothesis 3b argues the opposite. Model 5 
shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient of the interaction term of institutional 
constraints and risk-taking tendencies (β = –1.552, p-value < 0.05), suggesting that institutional 
constraints become less effective when risk-taking tendencies are strong and vice versa. This 
finding rejects Hypothesis 3a but supports Hypothesis 3b. 
To illustrate the analytic results, we plotted the effects suggested in Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively, in Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c. As Figure 2a illustrates, the CR–OS relationship increases 
when institutional constraints increase, suggesting that strong institutional constraints in home 
countries may result in a higher level of ownership for entering a high-risk host country (i.e., a 





1). Likewise, Figure 2b demonstrates a positive impact of risk-taking tendencies on the CR–OS 
relationship, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. In Figure 2c, there are two lines—one dashed 
and one solid—representing the effectiveness of institutional constraints in the presence of 
different levels of risk-taking tendencies. Specifically, the dashed line illustrates the effect of 
institutional constraints at a low level of risk-taking tendencies, and the solid line shows the 
effect at a high level. When risk-taking tendencies are weak (the dashed line), the greater the 
institutional constraints, the stronger the CR–OS relationship. However, when risk-taking 
tendencies are strong (the solid line), the greater the institutional constraints, the weaker the CR–
OS relationship. In other words, institutional constraints become less effective if risk-taking 
tendencies are strong, thereby demonstrating evidence consistent with the theoretical prediction 
in Hypothesis 3b.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
4.3. Non-publication bias and robustness tests  
We checked for non-publication bias and robustness in multiple ways. First, we assessed 
non-publication bias with the fail-safe N method and the trim-and-fill method (Duval & Tweedie, 
2000; Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). Results shown in the last column in Table 3 indicate that non-
publication bias is not a serious issue. Second, we adopted a winsorising procedure to address 
outliers by truncating the meta-regression data set (Barnett & Lewis, 1994). This procedure 
replaced any value above the 95th percentile of the sample data with the 95th percentile. Meta-
regression results based on the winsorised data (Model R1 in Table 6) are largely consistent with 
those in Table 5. Third, we reran Model 5 in Table 5 with alternative measures of institutional 





regulatory efficiency indicator of the Index of Economic Freedom, which is co-published by the 
Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation. It gauges the quality of regulatory 
environments in a country. Also, we measured risk-taking tendencies with the original value of 
the Hofstede uncertainty avoidance index. Meta-regression results with these alternative 
measures are in Models R2 and R3 in Table 6, respectively, showing consistent findings with 
those used to test our hypotheses. Fourth, we employed the multi-level regression technique to 
assess the nested effects between country- and study- levels (Hox, 2010). Results in Model R4 in 
Table 6 are largely consistent with those in Table 5. Fifth, we note that multiple articles present 
studies based on Japanese samples from the database maintained by Koyo Keizai. While these 
studies collected data in different years, the potential of data overlap deserves scrutiny. We 
therefore estimated an additional regression model by excluding Chan and Makino (2007) and 
Jung, et al. (2008). The former is based on 4,451 Japanese observations from 1988 to 1998, and 
the latter is based on 9,741 observations in 1985, 1991, 1993, 1996, 1998, and 1999, implying 
potential data overlap (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). After excluding the two studies, the remaining 
data set included four Japan-specific studies (Appendix 1). The regression results are in Model 
R5 in Table 6. Sixth, we conducted a subgroup analysis to rule out potential bias related to the 
overall development stage of home countries by running meta-regression with developed-country 
samples only. We obtained largely consistent results in Model R6 in Table 6. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------ 
5. Discussion and future research 
5.1. Theoretical contributions and future paths to theory development 
This study makes three main contributions to the literature. The foremost one is that the 





the contingency effects of home country institutions on the CR–OS relationship. Previous studies 
found that firms make internalisation decisions when the transaction costs of collaborative 
arrangements are higher than those of hierarchical governance (e.g., Brouthers, 2002; Taylor, 
Zou, & Osland, 1998). This study shows that the degree to which a firm engages in hierarchical 
governance is contingent on the firm’s home country institutional environments that set the limits 
of available resources at home. As such, our study extends internalisation theory from a home 
country institutional perspective and answers a research question regarding boundaries of the 
internalisation logic (Buckley & Casson, 1976). This effort responds to the call for research 
questions that a single IB theory cannot answer alone, thereby developing the theory further 
(Buckley, Doh, & Benischke, 2017). 
Related to this contribution, our second contribution is to demonstrate the mechanisms of 
home country–specific formal and informal institutions in the context of foreign market entry. 
Previous studies predicted the critical impact of formal and informal institutions on firm 
strategies and practices (Keig, et al., 2015) as well as their outcomes (Peng, et al., 2009). Our 
study extends this prediction by showing the positive effects of home country institutional 
constraints and risk-taking tendencies on the ownership level of a firm’s strategy in entering a 
risky environment. In so doing, this study distinguishes the effects of two institutional types and 
demonstrates how they affect firm internationalisation.  
Third, our study furthers knowledge on the interaction of formal and informal institutions. 
The extant literature shows that the two institutional types are complementary (Hall & Soskice, 
2001) as well as being a substitute for each other (Peng & Khoury, 2009). In the context of a 
firm’s choice of ownership strategy to enter a foreign country, our study finds supportive 
evidence for the substitute view so that the effect of formal institutions towards a strong CR–OS 





provides a parsimonious understanding of the country-level institutional factors, suggesting that 
institutions of one type may not solely determine home country conditions for firm 
internationalisation. Because a combination of institutional factors may not have the same impact 
as that of one factor, a prediction based on one type of institution may not always stand when 
taking another type into account. In this sense, firms from similar formal institutional 
environments may not behave in the same way if informal institutions vary between their home 
countries.  
Putting these contributions together suggests several paths to further develop IB theory. 
First, this paper widens the scope of internalisation theory by relaxing the unduly rigid 
assumptions about the home country and, more specifically, its formal and informal institutions. 
This suggests home country–specific approaches to advancing the theory. For instance, a firm’s 
home country may determine what resource configurations are available for the firm to 
internalise foreign market imperfections. These configurations do not take only home country–
specific advantages into consideration (Rugman, 1981) but disadvantages as well (Holburn & 
Zelner, 2010), both of which and the way to configure them define the conditions of firm 
internationalisation. In a similar vein, market imperfections of the home country may influence a 
firm’s decision on hierarchical expansion in foreign countries in that resource constraints do not 
always allow for internalising external imperfections in multiple markets, which suggests a firm’s 
trade-off between internalisation at home and abroad. This implies an alternative view of theory 
development. 
Second, emphasising both formal and informal institutions in the home country is a road to 
further and better theorising. Without unduly complicating the theory, incorporating the impacts 
and consequences of institutional constraints and cultural norms can extend the theory and help to 





showing how and why such propensities are shaped prior to internationalisation. Formal and 
informal institutions shape the environment where firms reside and managers live. A better 
understanding of such institutions facilitates both examination and extension of IB theory in a 
more parsimonious manner. 
Furthermore, the roles of both host and home country institutions can be factored into 
internalisation theory, thus extending its power in a way that considers relative conditions in host 
and home countries. IB researchers have recently been reappraising the role of risk in firm 
internationalisation (e.g., Jiménez, et al., 2018), and our study shows that the home country 
perspective has a significant impact on the assessment of risk in foreign entry. An extension of 
this view is that the impact of host country institutions on firm internationalisation may vary 
between firms originating from different home countries. Using this lens, an alternatively 
generalisable proposition may be that an institutional factor in host countries may not alone 
determine firm internationalisation but its relative effect compared with that in the home country 
may do so. In the context of country risk, for example, a more rigorous view would be the 
relative risk between home and host countries, showing whether and how much a country is 
riskier or less risky than another country, rather than an absolute value of the difference between 
risk levels. This proposition is consistent with previous research on the integration of institutional 
distance and directions (e.g., Zaheer, Schomaker, & Nachum, 2012) and deserves careful 
investigation in future research. 
Lastly, future research may make theoretical contributions by examining contingent factors 
of the complement–substitute debate on formal and informal institutions. A more nuanced theory 
of the relationship between formal and informal institutions may show how they influence each 
other and under what conditions, recommending a possible theory-development path starting 





between formal and informal institutions, and this finding may be verified in other IB decision-
making contexts. Besides examining IB decisions, another possible approach to addressing the 
debate may be taking the institutional diversity across countries into consideration (e.g., Jackson 
& Deeg, 2008). For instance, formal and informal institutions may complement each other in one 
context but become substitutes in another, suggesting an extension of our theoretical arguments 
in this study. 
5.2. Empirical contributions and methodology considerations 
This study offers a comprehensive synthesis of empirical studies on foreign ownership in a 
risky environment and builds on two prior meta-analyses related to this topic (Morschett, et al., 
2010; Zhao, et al., 2004). In this study, we found a modestly negative and significant CR–OS 
relationship. This is largely consistent with prior meta-analyses, but we offered theoretical 
clarification on the effect of country of origin presented in Zhao, et al. (2004) and provided the 
reasoning behind the mixed findings in Morschett, et al. (2010). The former study focuses on the 
U.S.-originated influence on entry mode choices, and the latter recognises inconsistent findings 
but does not explore the reasons for such inconsistencies. Our study demonstrates home 
institutional effects across a group of countries and attributes the heterogeneity of home country 
effects to the variation and interaction of formal and informal institutions. 
Given the modestly negative CR–OS relationship revealed in our study, we recommend 
that entry strategy and country risk scholars refocus their empirical settings from host country 
contexts to home country–specific contexts. Some recent studies have shown that greater 
sensitivity to the home country–specific mechanisms has the potential to explain variance in firm 
internationalisation (Cuervo-Cazurra, et al., 2018). Yet the extant literature still lacks the variety 





entry strategy) deserve re-examination in different home country contexts. Such re-examination 
may verify empirical findings obtained from developed countries (e.g., Japan) and popularly 
investigated developing economies (e.g., China). Our meta-analysis shows, for example, there are 
six single-country studies based on Japanese samples and eight single-country studies based on 
Chinese samples. While our robustness tests show that the exclusion of some primary studies 
does not materially change the results, the large proportion of one country’s samples in the 
literature may be a methodological concern that deserves future investigation. 
Furthermore, our meta-regression shows that effects of some control variables are not as 
significant as they are expected, suggesting re-examination of some factors related to the CR–OS 
relationship. For example, while international experience has been found to affect firms’ 
ownership strategies (e.g., Tang & Gudergan, 2018), this factor did not obtain a significant 
coefficient in the regression model when other factors were taken into consideration. Also, 
subgroup analyses about international experience (Appendix 2) show that the CR–OS 
relationship is –0.148 in the subgroup with above-average experience and –0.102 in the below-
average subgroup. Compared with the overall CR–OS relationship (mean ρ = –0.101), the 
difference of the two subgroups (i.e., 0.04) does not seem to be substantial. Incorporating the 
regression results with the subgroup analyses suggests that the difference in international 
experience may not significantly alter the CR–OS relationship. In other words, although a firm 
with more international experience than average firms is prudent to choose a high-ownership 
strategy in a risky environment, another firm with less international experience may be prudent as 
well. This finding implies that international experience may not materially change the negative 
relationship between host country risk and a firm’s ownership strategy. Similar logic applies to 
other nonsignificant control variables in the meta-regression models, but further investigation 





5.3. Managerial implications  
This study has implications for managers in charge of foreign market entry. Our findings 
show that the CR–OS relationship is moderated by home country institutions, suggesting that 
firms from countries characterised by strong institutional constraints on policymakers or strong 
risk-taking tendencies are likely to take a high level of ownership to enter a high-risk host 
country. Thus, we recommend that managers first assess, before an entry strategy decision, the 
extent to which their home country environment may facilitate a certain level of foreign 
ownership. 
5.4. Limitations 
Besides the contributions and future research paths, we note several limitations in this 
study, suggesting the possibility of overinterpreting the empirical results and requiring close 
scrutiny. First, because the effect sizes analysed in this study are correlations, a causal association 
between host country risk and the level of foreign ownership cannot be assumed. Second, both 
formal and informal institutions have various aspects and dimensions, though this study examines 
institutional constraints on policymakers and risk-taking tendencies with an assumption that these 
two institutional factors are more directly related to a firm’s strategy for entering a risky 
environment. Future studies may benefit from relaxing this assumption and testing various 
institutional types. Third, like what many other review studies have shown, it is almost 
impossible to account for all relevant studies. We have put significant efforts into searching the 
literature, but there could be missing studies. 
6. Conclusion 
This study proposes that the relationship between host country risk and foreign ownership 





effect. Our tests of theoretical arguments based on the internalisation logic and the institution-
based view demonstrate the positive impacts of institutional constraints and risk-taking 
tendencies and, jointly, their negative impact on the focal relationship. These findings shed new 
light on the literature of host country risk and foreign ownership strategy by taking home country 
institutions into consideration for firm internationalisation. 
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Funnel plot for the relationship between host country risk and the ownership level of a firm’s 
entry strategy a 
 
 
a The solid vertical line indicates the fixed-effect summary estimate. The two dashed lines that 
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(a) Effect of institutional constraints on the country risk–ownership strategy relationship 
  
  
(b) Effect of risk-taking tendencies on the country risk–ownership strategy relationship 
 
 
(c) Interaction between institutional constraints and risk-taking tendencies 
 
Figure 2 
Illustrations of hypothesized effects a 
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Four complementary methods were used to identify published and unpublished 
relevant studies: 
1. Searching the ABI, Ebsco, and JSTOR database with a combination of two sets 
of keywords, one of which is about foreign market entry strategy (Morschett, et 
al., 2010; Zhao, et al., 2004), and another of which is about country risk (Cosset 
& Roy, 1991; Miller, 1992), for published work; and seeking for unpublished 
research via AIB and AOM networks, and through the eLibrary of SSRN and 
Academia.edu.  
2. Manually searching ten top-tier journals in international business, management, 
marketing, and other disciplines alike (Harzing, 2018). 
3. Using snowball technique to manually search citations of the included papers 
and references of relevant review papers (e.g., Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; 
Canabal & White III, 2008; De Villa, Rajwani, & Lawton, 2015; Malhotra, 
Agarwal, & Ulgado, 2003; Morschett, et al., 2010; Schellenberg, Harker, & 
Jafari, 2018; Surdu & Mellahi, 2016; Surdu, Mellahi, & Glaister, 2018; Zhao, et 
al., 2004) for identifying studies missed in the prior steps.  
4. Contacting authors for correlation matrixes if these were not reported.  
These steps resulted in an initial reservoir of 772 articles. 
 
We further screened the identified studies according to the following inclusion 
criteria: 
1. Relevant to the focal relationship. 
2. Quantitative studies. 
3. Sample size and correlation coefficients for the focal relationship were reported. 
4. Independent studies, which were defined as those that reported statistical 
information based on different datasets. 
Following these criteria, we retained 58 articles that reported 64 independent 
studies. A list of these articles is in the Appendix 1. 
Study 
Coding 
Following the recommendations of Lipsey and Wilson (2001), we constructed the 
final dataset in the following steps: 
1. A coding protocol was developed after reading the retained articles. 
2. With the protocol, an author and a research assistant surveyed the retained 
studies independently to extract article information and correlation coefficients 
of the focal relationship, resulting in inter-coder reliability of 0.97 (Cohen’s κ 
coefficient, Cohen, 1960). 
3. Two coders reached consensus on discrepancies by reviewing the coding 
protocol and the literature together. 
Analysis 
Procedures 
We conducted our analysis in two stages: 
1. Following Hedges and Olkin (1985), we aggregated effect sizes of all studies to 
evaluate the mean effect size of the focal relationship, and computed the Q and 
I2 statistics to assess the homogeneity of the effect size (Hedges & Olkin, 1985; 
Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003). 
2. We tested our hypotheses using meta-regression analyses (weighted least 
squares) recommended by Lipsey and Wilson (2001). 







Measures of the control variables 
 
Variable Measure 
GDP To control the economy development status, we included the log of 
gross domestic product (GDP) of the home country. 
Judicial proceedings We controlled for the legal environment by including the resolving 
insolvency scale of the Distance to Frontier composed by the World 
Bank. This scale measures the strength of the legal framework 
applicable to judicial liquidation that reflects the degree to which a 
firm is easy to do business in a country. 
Investor protection We included the minority investor protection scale of the Distance to 
Frontier to take potential expropriation into consideration. This scale 
measures the degree to which investors are protected in the presence of 
conflicts of interest. 
Manufacturing industry To control for the variance between industry sectors, we included a 
dummy variable. It is 1 if a primary study uses a sample of 
manufacturing firms; 0, otherwise. 
SMEs Taking firm size into consideration, a dummy variable was controlled 
as 1 for primary studies using a sample of small- and medium- sized 
enterprises (SMEs); 0, otherwise. We followed the size standards of 
the US Small Business Administration to define SMEs. 
International experience We controlled for international experience that could affect a firm’s 
foreign entry strategies by including a dummy variable. It is 1 if a 
study is based on a sample whose international experience is above the 
average level of included studies that measured international 
experience in the same way as the study did; 0, otherwise. 
Median sample year We added the median year of the sample window to control for the 
possibility that the focal relationship weakens over time. 
Cross-sectional data To control for the variance between research methods, a dummy 
variable was included. It is 1 for primary studies based on cross-
sectional data; 0, otherwise. 
Published work  = 1 if a study was published, 0 otherwise. This dummy variable 
addresses the "file drawer problem".  
Journal impact factor To test for the publication quality effect, we included each publication 









Meta-analysis results for the relationship between host country risk and foreign ownership strategy a 
 
Predictor k N Mean ρ   s.e. Q I2 Fail-safe 
N 
Country risk – Ownership strategy  
(CR-OS) relationship  
64    52,229  –0.101 * 0.005   2,101.11  *** 0.970 86 
Home regions          
 Developing economies 10     5,188  –0.131 
* 0.014     109.85  *** 0.918 15 
  China 8     2,517  –0.022  0.020       30.55  
*** 0.771 8 
  Other developing economies 2     2,671  –0.233 
* 0.019       21.71  *** 0.954 3 
 Developed countries 38    29,525  –0.116 
* 0.006   1,288.11  *** 0.971 52 
  Finland 2        529  0.129 
* 0.044       22.50  *** 0.956 2 
  Germany 3        625  –0.010  0.040       10.72  
*** 0.813 3 
  Japan 6    22,492  –0.188 
* 0.007     242.23  *** 0.979 6 
  The Netherlands 3     1,144  0.066 
* 0.030       18.91  *** 0.894 3 
  Portugal 2        421  0.162 
* 0.049         2.01   0.501 3 
  Swiss 2        272  0.190  0.098         2.29   0.56 3 
  US 4        536  0.015  0.044       31.25  
*** 0.9 4 
    Other developed countries 16     3,506  0.170 * 0.017     430.26  *** 0.97 16 
a k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; Mean ρ = mean of population correlation; s.e. = standard error;  Q = Cochran's 
homogeneity test statistics; I2 = scale free index of heterogeneity; Fail-safe N = the measure of non-publication bias. 
Results of additional analyses at industry-, firm-, and study- levels are available in Appendix 2. 









Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of variables in meta-regression a 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Institutional constraints 1            
2 Risk-taking tendencies 0.385 1           
3 GDP –0.310 0.074 1          
4 Judicial proceedings 0.786 0.272 –0.121 1         
5 Investor protection 0.257 0.555 –0.028 0.430 1        
6 Manufacturing industry –0.181 –0.070 0.069 –0.140 –0.097 1       
7 SMEs 0.147 0.234 –0.118 0.125 0.076 –0.130 1      
8 International experience 0.039 –0.186 –0.120 0.150 –0.130 0.089 0.214 1     
9 Median sample year –0.063 –0.460 –0.146 –0.180 –0.386 –0.168 0.164 –0.087 1    
10 Cross-sectional data –0.240 0.024 –0.220 –0.191 0.134 –0.086 0.333 –0.052 0.198 1   
11 Published work 0.132 0.307 0.091 0.240 0.339 0.175 0.139 0.163 –0.315 –0.268 1  
12 Journal impact factor 0.160 0.351 0.299 0.160 0.193 –0.104 0.069 0.028 –0.351 –0.183 0.411 1 
 Mean 0.38 2.48 28.3 74.15 56.32 0.26 0.18 0.24 2001 0.26 0.92 4.39 
 SD 0.22 0.55 1.47 22.81 11.35 0.45 0.39 0.43 6.95 0.45 0.27 3.17 
  VIF 5.11 2.81 1.67 4.22 2.27 1.21 1.59 1.37 1.95 1.82 1.75 1.59 








Results of meta-regression on the country risk–ownership strategy relationship a 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
H1: Institutional constraints (IC)  0.847**  0.569 * 3.823* 
   (0.258)  (0.227)  (1.511) 
H2: Risk-taking tendencies (RT)   0.250* 0.161 * 0.818* 
    (0.093) (0.077)  (0.318) 
H3: IC × RT        –1.552* 
       (0.706) 
GDP –0.044  –0.008  –0.047  –0.021   –0.029  
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.030) (0.035)  (0.031) 
Judicial proceedings –0.003  –0.009** –0.003 †  –0.007 ** –0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Investor protection 0.001  0.001  –0.003  –0.001   0.001  
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.004) 
Manufacturing industry 0.055  0.049  0.049  0.049   0.073  
 (0.104) (0.101) (0.103) (0.103)  (0.088) 
SMEs 0.179  0.100  0.043  0.042   0.002  
 (0.166) (0.151) (0.157) (0.155)  (0.127) 
International experience –0.038  0.028)  0.051  0.060   0.051  
 (0.099) (0.102) (0.103) (0.107)  (0.085) 
Median sample year 0.002  0.001  0.009  0.006   0.004  
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) 
Cross-sectional data –0.121  –0.021  –0.099  –0.040   –0.081  
 (0.123) (0.110) (0.104) (0.107)  (0.095) 
Published work –0.102  –0.023  –0.102  –0.050   –0.090  
 (0.119) (0.114) (0.106) (0.103)  (0.112) 
Journal impact factor 0.005  –0.003  0.000  –0.003   0.001  
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)  (0.015) 
Constant –2.442  –0.949  –16.103  –10.459   –9.395  
 (14.694) (13.625) (15.129) (13.977)  (13.631) 
F 1.120  2.680* 2.010 †  4.670 *** 10.100*** 
R-squared 0.184  0.368  0.359  0.418   0.530  
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. The estimation results from the weighted least squares 
regression on Stata 15.1. k = 38, N = 32,854.  







Robustness tests on the meta-regression results a 
  Model R1 Model R2 Model R3 Model R4 Model R5 Model R6 
Institutional constraints (IC) 3.820 * 0.096 * 1.618 ** 4.008 *** 3.867* 3.410 * 
 (1.511)  (0.037)  (0.512)  (1.098)  (1.514) (1.500)  
Risk-taking tendencies (RT) 0.817 * 3.423 * 0.014 * 0.836 *** 0.826* 0.723 * 
 (0.318)  (1.418)  (0.006)  (0.228)  (0.315) (0.268)  
IC × RT –1.551 * –0.038 * –0.029 * –1.598 ** –1.562* –1.335  †  
 (0.706)  (0.017)  (0.013)  (0.508)  (0.702) (0.647)  
GDP –0.029   0.011   –0.016   –0.024   –0.027  –0.012   
 (0.031)  (0.038)  (0.030)  (0.022)  (0.031) (0.040)  
Judicial proceedings –0.007 ** –0.002   –0.007 ** –0.007 ** –0.007** –0.008 * 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003)  
Investor protection 0.001   –0.004   0.002   0.002   0.001  –0.002   
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.005) (0.005)  
Manufacturing industry 0.073   0.168   0.077   0.082   0.070  0.207  †  
 (0.088)  (0.106)  (0.088)  (0.062)  (0.089) (0.103)  
SMEs 0.002   0.007   0.012   –0.015   –0.006  –0.143   
 (0.126)  (0.148)  (0.124)  (0.081)  (0.127) (0.127)  
International experience 0.051   0.094   0.030   0.077   0.074  0.145   
 (0.085)  (0.098)  (0.087)  (0.069)  (0.089) (0.098)  
Median sample year 0.004   0.014 * 0.002   0.005   0.005  0.009   
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.007) (0.007)  
Cross-sectional data –0.081   –0.071   –0.071   –0.060   –0.078  0.147   
 (0.095)  (0.081)  (0.097)  (0.077)  (0.096) (0.180)  
Published work –0.090   –0.156   -0.016   –0.126   –0.082  0.125   
 (0.112)  (0.110)  (0.130)  (0.122)  (0.114) (0.200)  
Journal impact factor 0.001   0.007   0.000   0.000   –0.002  0.014   
 (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.016) (0.019)  
Constant –9.392   –37.144 * –3.804   –10.344   –9.883  –17.980   
 (13.621)  (15.036)  (12.458)  (9.982)  (13.807) (14.544)  
F 10.180 *** 6.270 *** 8.760 ***    8.220*** 50.610 *** 
R-squared 0.530  0.512  0.493    0.537 0.652  
Wald chi2       46.700 ***    
Log likelihood             16.991          
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. k = 38, N = 32, 854, except Models R5 and R6.  
† p-value < 0.10, * p-value < 0.05, ** p-value < 0.01, *** p-value < 0.001. 
Model R1: winsorised data. Model R2: Institutional constraints is measured as a regulatory efficiency 
indicator of the Index of Economic Freedom. Model R3: Risk-taking tendencies is measured as the 
uncertainty-avoidance index (the original value) of the Hofstede cultural framework. Model R4: 
Multilevel cross-effects regression. Number of study-level observations = 38, number of country-level 
observations =16. Model R5: samples excluding Chan and Makino (2007) and Jung, et al. (2008), k = 36, 











Home country or economy 
Arslan and Dikova (2015) b  184  0.16 c Finland 
Arslan and Larimo (2010) b  345  –0.28 c Finland 
Arslan, Tarba, and Larimo (2015)  348  0.27 c Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway 
Brouthers and Brouthers (2003) a 146/72 –0.14/–0.23 The Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom 
Brouthers and Nakos (2004)  185  –0.33 c The Netherlands, Greece 
Brouthers (1995) b  106  0.31 c United States 
Brouthers (2002)  178  –0.01 Europe 
Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner 
(2000) 
 116  0.12 c Europe 
Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner 
(2002) 
 116  –0.20 c Europe 
Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner 
(2003) 
 158  –0.09 The Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom 
Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner 
(2008) 
 99  0.11 c The Netherlands, Greece 
Chan and Makino (2007) b  4,451  –0.04 Japan 
Chang, Kao, Kuo, and Chiu 
(2012) b 
 2,451  0.26 c Taiwan 
Contractor and Kundu (1998)  745  0.23 North America, Europe, Asia 
Cuypers and Martin (2010)  6,472  –0.08 41 countries (names not specified) 
Czinkota, Grossman, Javalgi, and 
Nugent (2009) b 
 62  0.15 United States 
Delios and Beamish (1999) b  1,043  –0.22 Japan 
Delios and Henisz (2000) b  2,827  –0.18 Japan 
Efrat and Shoham (2013) b  104  0.20 Israel 
Elia, Massini, and Narula (2017)  486  0.17 c Australia, Austria, Denmark, France, India, Ireland, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, The Netherlands, 
United Kingdom, United States 
Erramilli, et al. (1997) b  177  –0.14 South Korea 
Grande and Teixeira (2012) b  334  0.13 Portugal 
Hollenstein and Berger (2015) ab 107/110  –0.12/0.19 Austria, Swiss 
Ji and Dimitratos (2013) b  233  –0.05 China 
Jiang, Fu, Akter, Li, and Wu 
(2015) b 
 775  0.05 China 
Jung, et al. (2008) b  9,741  –0.22 Japan 
Laufs, et al. (2016) b  192  –0.21 Germany 
Lojacono, Misani, and Tallman 
(2017) 
 261  –0.30 c Algeria, Argentina, Malaysia, Australia, Mexico, Belarus, The 
Netherlands, Belgium, New Zealand, Brazil, Norway, 
Bulgaria, Pakistan, Canada, Philippines, China, Poland, 
Colombia, Ireland, Czechoslovakia, Russian, Denmark, Saudi 
Arabia, East Germany, Singapore, Egypt, Slovak Republic, 
Finland, South Africa, France, South Korea, Germany, Spain, 
Hong Kong, Switzerland, Hungary, Taiwan, India, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, Ukraine, Israel, Unit. Arab Em., Italy, 












Home country or economy 
Lu (2002) b  1,194  –0.01 Japan 
Lu, et al. (2018) b  110  0.12 c China 
Luo (2001) b  174  –0.31 China 
Maekelburger, et al. (2012) b  206  0.10 Germany 
Mardanov (2003) a 46/42/37 0.23/0.46/0.53 Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Italy, Latvia, 
Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Sweden, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom, United States 
Mutinelli and Piscitello (1998) b  947  0.27 Italy 
Nakos and Brouthers (2002) b  118  –0.46 c Greece 
Nielsen and Nielsen (2011) b  165  0.00 Swiss 
Pak and Park (2004) b  3,236  –0.36 Japan 
Pan (1996)  2,516  –0.17 United States, Japan, Europe, Hong Kong, Asia other 
Parola, Satta, Persico, and Di 
Bella (2013) 
 416  0.11 c (names not specified) 
Pinho (2007) b  87  0.30 Portugal 
Pla-Barber, Sanchez-Peinado, 
and Madhok (2010) b 
 328  –0.05 Spain 
Rajan and Pangarkar (2000) b  83  –0.54 Singapore 
Richards and Yang (2007)  543  0.79 United States, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, Canada 
Roh, Cho, Moon, and Lee 
(2013) 
 96  –0.20 c (names not specified) 
Schwens, et al. (2011) b  227  0.06 Germany 
Shao, Hasan, and Shao (1995) b  156  –0.34 c United States 
Shieh and Wu (2011) 929/796 0.07/–0.05 Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and China 
Shieh and Wu (2012) a  1,831  0.15 South Korea, Taiwan, Europe, Japan, Singapore, United 
States, Hong Kong, China, Malaysia 
Shrader, Oviatt, and McDougall 
(2000) b 
 212  –0.10 United States 
Slangen and van Tulder (2009) b  231  –0.18 The Netherlands 
Tsai and Cheng (2002)  105  0.13 Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and China 
Tsang (2005)  2,416  0.23 c United States, Europe, Japan, China, Hong Kong, Macau, 
and Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand 
(Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, 
& Eden) 
 220  0.07 96 emerging countries (names not specified) 
Williams and Martinez (2012) b  624  0.19 The Netherlands 
Williams, Lukoianova, and 
Martinez (2016) b 
 289  –0.10 c The Netherlands 
Xie (2014) b 445 -0.10 China 
Xie (2017) b 388 0.11 China 
Xie and Li (2017) ab 80/312  –0.12/–0.03 c China 
a Articles reporting multiple studies. 
b Studies included in the meta-regression analysis. 
c Reverse coded prior to analyses, if the study operationalises variables in a different direction from others 
(e.g., a study operates entry strategy as 0 for wholly owned subsidiaries and 1 for joint ventures, but other 






Results of additional meta-analyses of the country risk–ownership strategy relationship a 
Predictor k N Mean ρ   s. e. Q I2 Fail-safe N 
Country risk – Ownership strategy (CR-OS) relationship 64    52,229  –0.101 * 0.005   2,101.11  *** 0.970 86 
Median sample year          
Before 1990 6     10,810 –0.075 * 0.009     139.87  *** 0.964 6 
Between 1990 and 2000 26    27,878  –0.106 * 0.006   1,016.04  *** 0.975 34 
After 2000 32    13,541  –0.115 * 0.009     538.93  *** 0.942 48 
Industry          
Manufacturing 13     7,814  –0.109 * 0.011     501.94  *** 0.976 19 
Service 8     2,311  0.007  0.021       75.56  *** 0.907 8 
not specified 43    42,104  –0.106 * 0.005   1,099.51  *** 0.962 58 
Firm size          
Small- and medium-sized enterprises 15     5,545  –0.190 * 0.014     326.59  *** 0.957 23 
Large firms 22    25,776  –0.125 * 0.006     538.44  *** 0.961 28 
not specified 27    20,908  –0.050 * 0.007     728.99  *** 0.964 35 
International experience          
Above average 17    14,458  –0.148 * 0.008     659.18  *** 0.976 24 
Below average 27    26,810  –0.102 * 0.006     640.12  *** 0.959 34 
not specified 20    10,961  –0.040 * 0.010     333.98  *** 0.943 29 
Measure of country risk          
Political constrains index by Henisz 6    14,270  –0.189 * 0.008       65.25  *** 0.923 9 
Euromoney's country risk index 7     8,932  –0.091 * 0.011       77.82  *** 0.923 7 
Institutional Investor's country risk ratings 6     9,435  –0.065 * 0.010     247.16  *** 0.980 8 
International country risk index by the PRS Group 8     7,282  0.076 * 0.012     367.53  *** 0.981 12 
World governance index by the World Bank 10     5,756  –0.113 * 0.013     163.64  *** 0.945 15 
World competitiveness index by IMD 2     3,332  –0.344 * 0.017       28.35  *** 0.965 3 
survey 22     2,714  0.021  0.019     152.10  *** 0.862 25 
other indices b 3        508  0.017  0.045         8.03  * 0.751 4 
Measure of ownership strategy          
Wholly owned subsidiaries vs. Joint ventures 29    26,534  –0.137 * 0.006     801.84  *** 0.965 42 
Equity vs non-equity strategies 21     3,755  0.129 * 0.016     109.26  *** 0.817 23 
multiple strategies 14    21,940  –0.098 * 0.007     564.28  *** 0.977 14 
a k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size, Mean ρ = mean of population correlation; s.e. = standard error;  Q = Cochran's homogeneity test statistics; I2 = 
scale free index of heterogeneity; Fail-safe N = the measure of non-publication bias. 
b “Other indices” include country risk reported by the Business Environment Risk Intelligence and the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Hermes Country Risk 
Rating. 
